Introduction
The control and management of water resources played an important role in the industrialization and urbanization of Brazil in the last century. Particularly since the early 1930s, the exploitation of rivers, lakes, groundwater and the coast became an integral part of national and regional development programmes. In a few decades, the accelerated rates of economic growth, combined with inadequate environmental regulation and deficient public services, created a situation of growing environmental degradation and manmade water scarcity in many parts of the country (Ioris, 2007) . It was especially during the military dictatorship that hardcore economic development was exploited as a main legitimating strategy for the ruling regime. It was only after the end of the dictatorship that an open debate on the need to reform water regulation became politically possible. It took more than a decade of congressional discussion to approve the new Water Act in 1997 (Law 9433/1997), which primarily aims at the restoration of the environmental condition of water bodies and the improvement of water use efficiency. The main forum for stakeholder participation under the new law is the river basin committee, which congregates representatives from water users, government and civil society. The legislation introduced new regulatory instruments, such as plans, licences and environmental charges, and established the National Water Resources Management System (SINGREH). 1 Crucially, the new legal framework encapsulates a fundamental tension between social and environmental demands and an increased emphasis on the economic value of water resources. This tension corresponds to the contrast in the priorities of local communities, business sectors and governmental agencies. As pointed out by Mollinga (2008) , changes in water management are not simply a technical problem, but water politics are at the heart of its policies and management approaches.
In order to understand the ongoing reforms, it is necessary to recognise the influence of multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, IADB, GEF and JBIC, on development of new policies and legislation in Brazil. Conca (2006) , one of the most important principles that was exported to
Brazil and influenced the emerging regulation is the concept of integrated water resources management (IWRM), which is defined by Davis (2007) as "a facilitated stakeholder process to promote coordinated activities in pursuit of common goals for multiple objective development and management of water founded in sustainable water resource systems" (see also Global Water Partnership, 2003) . To a large extent, the IWRM doctrine provided the conceptual and methodological rationale for the new public policies and regulatory instruments that are now being applied to the solution of water problems in Brazil. It is relevant to mention also that the introduction of new water regulation in Brazil also coincided with a period of economic adjustment and reorientation of the role of the national state (The Economist, 14 Apr 2007), under pressures for market liberalisation and deeper insertion into the global economy (Mollo and Saad-Filho, 2006) . The new economic policies and neoliberal development strategies have significantly shifted the framing of water problems and the formulation of (public and private) responses.
The aim of this essay is to examine the extent that the institutional water reforms have been able to answer to the pressing demands for environmental restoration and conflict resolution in Brazil. Our research focuses on a case study of the Paraíba do Sul River Basin (henceforth, PSRB). The analysis was based on a preparatory fieldtrip in 2006 and a main data collection campaign between March and May of 2007. In addition to informal contacts with local stakeholders, twenty semi-structured, confidential interviews were carried out (most were later complemented by further e-mail discussions) with industrialists, sanitation companies, NGOs, government officials (from municipal, state and federal agencies) and river basin committee members. The study also involved content analysis of documentation
and attendance to open meetings (including sessions of the river basin committee). The research followed the recommendation of Watts and Peet (2004) that the investigation of the relations between events, structures and mechanisms, through a stratified sense of reality, can deploy a toolkit to explain the world via the reconstruction of existing theories about ecological questions. Sayer (1992) also points out that explanation in social sciences emerges from the dialectical movement from the abstract (the isolation of particular attributes and relationships from the whole) and the concrete (the multiplicity of structures and events that comprise the world). Santos (2002a) adds that the researcher needs to recognize the causal powers of particular aspects (such as water charges and public participation in the case of this study) that have autonomy but are at the same time integral parts of the concrete totality.
Before moving to the case study, it is first necessary to explore in more detail the IWRM proposition.
Interrogating the Institutional Water Reforms
There is a growing awareness around the world today of problems related to water use and conservation, ranging from local issues, such as river pollution and lack of water supply, to global challenges associated with climate change and desertification. This rising concern with the need to better manage water systems is reflected in the daily coverage of the mass media and in the work of academics and universities (for example, in Britain alone there are more than 60 master degrees on water-related topics). Issues of water management are certainly not new, but had already been considered by economists, engineers and philosophers at least since the 19 th century. In the first decades of the 20 th century, water management became associated with regional development and economic growth, such as the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the 1930s. The TVA example later influenced the construction of dams and expansion of water infrastructure all over the world (e.g. some of the largest dams were built in Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s). However, before too long, it became evident that water engineering and the unchecked exploitation of water resources were causing widespread environmental impacts and, in many cases, frustrating public demands. Concepts and techniques started to be revised in the last quarter of the 20 th century and began to emphasise the integration of environmental conservation with multiple uses of water and the interface with other landscape processes (such as land use and urban expansion).
The concept that better epitomises the contemporary attempts to improve water management is the aforementioned IWRM (Molle, 2006) , which has two fundamental pillars:
public participation and the recognition of the economic value of water. Other related notions, such as 'adaptive management' and a 'transition management', have also expanded the academic literature that underpins the institutional reforms in the water sector (Craswell et al., 2007) . One of the best examples of the translation of such concepts into public policies was the approval of the Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC) in Europe in the year 2000, a comprehensive piece of legislation that try to address water problems from 'source to mouth'. However, the transition from old to new approaches, in Europe and elsewhere, has not been without tension and controversy. On the contrary, there have been major difficulties to follow the timetable and the objectives set up by the new water policies (European Commission, 2007) . To comprehend the controversies around the current attempts to regulate and manage water, it is necessary to examine the contradictions of the governing theory of water regulation. Technical insufficiencies, local resistance by water mangers and lack of coordination between public agencies have already been identified as serious limitations of the new approaches (e.g. Fischhendler, 2008; Funke et al., 2007) , but the more fundamental weaknesses of the IWRM doctrine are not normally acknowledged. For explanatory purposes, Table 1 presents a typology of the intrinsic shortcomings of the IWRM model, which are discussed below. water users and, in the case of a water dispute, "IWRM can at best be a distant goal" and "it is not clear whether it can guarantee sustainability requirements" (Anand, 2007: 115) .
Because elusive claims for wide-ranging integration alone seem unable to offer much guidance, practitioners and regulators tend to pick and choose only those aspects of the IWRM that appear more feasible. The recent experience shows that in many cases where IWRM has been tried, local water managers are inclined to drop the more ambitious goals of integration and normally restrict their intervention to a small number of workable management options (Blomquist and Schlager, 2005) . Attempts to integrate policy reforms and achieve better water governance (as postulated by Galaz, 2007) are also constrained by the policy inertia settled over environmental regulatory agencies (Kirk et al., 2007) .
Political limitation: the epistemological and operational limits of IWRM mentioned above seem to have a more elemental source, which is the difficulty to accept the politicised basis of water management. There is a persistent reluctance among decision-makers to recognise the mechanisms of exclusion from access to water, or the relationship between flows of water and the circulation of power and money (Swyngedouw, 2004) . Most of those sponsoring the IWRM agenda hesitate to admit that the differences between social groups can have a major influence on water allocation and on the distribution of negative impacts. It has been observed elsewhere that a critical limitation of IWRM is the entrenched mindset of water managers and hydrologists, who consider socioeconomic and political issues a deviation from the 'purist' goals of water management (McCulloch and Ioris, 2007) . Some may even concede the relevance of political disputes, but argue that water conflicts as merely a form of circumstantial nuisances to be overcome or avoided and not a permanent feature of water management (Blomquist and Schlager, 2005) . Many attempts that try to relate water management with broader governmental reforms also fail to hit the political core and, in particular, ignore complex social, economic, material and discursive arrangements (Köhler, 2005) . Against the denial of the political dimension of water management, Swatuk (2005) recommends that it is important to reconsider and be prepared to revise the basic assumptions driving IWRM-based reforms.
Because of the these intrinsic shortcomings, many experiences informed by the IWRM theory have fallen short of addressing the full extent of the nexus between economic growth, environmental degradation and socio-political injustices. That represents is a major weakness of the new regulation model, specially considering that, in countries such as Brazil, conflicts over natural resources are linked to systems of political control established since the colonial period (Bryant, 1998) . It is not by chance that the same groups with less political power normally have fewer opportunities to have access to natural resources and suffer from a lower quality of the local environment. Social inequalities are systematically translated into an asymmetric distribution of information (Goldin et al., 2008) , the exclusion of the weaker groups from water regulation (Zhouri and Oliveira, 2005) and the centralisation of the decision-making in the hands of higher authorities (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; van der Zaag, 2005) . Conventional approaches to public participation, such as advocated by IWRM, have a tendency to override existing decision-making processes, reinforce the interests of the already powerful and remove other perfectly legitimate management mechanisms (cf. Cooke and Kothari, 2001 ). The alternative is the promotion of genuine participatory strategies, which require both the transfer of power to the local level and an effective accountability of the political representation (Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2002) . Hickey and Mohan (2005) indicate that participatory approaches are more likely to succeed where they are pursued as part of a wider radical political project with the involvement of currently marginalized groups.
The remaining of this essay will discuss the IWRM experience in the PSRB in the light of the above observations. This is a river basin where old management approaches, based on supply augmentation and river engineering, are now being replaced by new practices based on demand management inspired by the IWRM theory. Despite changes in the official discourse of governmental agencies and the local river basin committee, the next pages will
show that the inherent limitations of IWRM-informed regulation have prevented the achievement of satisfactory responses to environmental and social problems. The main innovative contribution of this study is the fact that, while some publications have addressed the problems of water management in the PSRB, less attention has been given to the power nuances of the water regulatory reforms.
Case study of the Paraíba do Sul River Basin (PSRB)
The river basin
The PSRB is located in the southeast of Brazil ( Figure 1 ) and is one of the country's most dynamic economic areas, currently responding for around 11 per cent of the national GDP. Its strategic locaton and the abundance of natural resources provided favourable conditions for the expansion of cities, industries and agriculture in the river basin. facilitated the rapid development of a diversified industrial activity (Müller, 1969) , which currently includes more than 8,500 manufacturing units (CEIVAP, 2001 ). In addition, there are more than 120 hydropower stations in operation in the river basin (seven with more than 50MW of installed capacity). benefited from the strategic location and abundance of natural resources in the river basin, economic development left a lasting legacy of river degradation and stakeholder conflicts (Aquino and Farias, 1998) . It led to serious disputes between upstream and downstream water users related to the impacts of environmental degradation and the failure to observe environmental legislation (Gruben et al., 2002) . Treacherous biological conditions are particularly evident in the middle section of the Paraíba do Sul River where most of industry and hydroelectricity are located (Araujo et al. 2003) . The more polluted river stretches have rates of coliform bacteria between 50 and 160 times the legal threshold; water pollution is aggravated by the fact that only 17.6% of the catchment sewage receives some form of treatment (Coppetec, 2006) . 4 The total rate of water demand amounts to 263 m 3 /s, which represents a significant pressure on available water resources (it is more than 74% of the low flows -see reference to Q 95 in 'note 2'). In addition, there are 256 sites of sand extraction for civil engineering, where the total evaporation of water (i.e. water loss) is equivalent to the water demanded by 326,000 inhabitants or 6% of the river basin population (Dos Reis et al., 2006) . It was only in the 1990s, when the level of pollution started to attract international condemnation and the reform of the national regulatory framework was being discussed in the parliament, that the Paraíba do Sul River Basin Committee (CEIVAP) was eventually established. CEIVAP is the official forum for debating long-term plans, addressing specific water problems and approving water charges (while the responsibility for issuing water licences and charging water users remains with the National Water Agency, ANA, the state regulator for rivers under the jurisdiction of the federal government). 6 The committee was certainly not established in a political vacuum (Gruben et al., 2002) , but as a result of a long mobilization in the river basin (always stronger in the state of São Paulo) and in the whole country (the committee was in fact created in 1996, but was already under the spirit of the Because of the relevance of the local experience for the national water policies, since its early days the federal government provided constant support for the organisation of CEIVAP (Braga et al., 2005) . The new committee, therefore, was much better posited to deal with environmental problems than its predecessors. However, despite the institutional improvement, environmental degradation remains virtually unchanged in the river basin, as extensively documented in the master plans and by the environmental surveying services.
The river basin continues to suffer from untreated domestic sewerage, industrial effluent discharge, sand mining and over extraction of water (cf. Araujo et al., 2003; Carvalho and Magrini, 2006; Pereira et al., 2006) . In our interviews, various stakeholders expressed their concern about the competence of the new committee to deal with old and new water management problems. One major problem has been the difficulty that CEIVAP has to integrate federal and state regulation (the former applies to the main river and major tributaries, and the latter applies to the remaining tributaries). 7 The dual nature of water regulation (i.e. federal and state responsibilities for the same river system) is frequently blamed for the difficulty to implement the new water legislation in the large Brazilian river basins. In the PSRB alone, 13 tributaries or sections of the PSRB have their own sub-basic committees or their own consortium of municipalities, which not necessarily communicate to each other or with the overall catchment committee (CEIVAP). 8 It is perhaps ironic that the same reforms that aimed to advance integrated water management ended up creating a large fragmentation by tributaries and sub-basins.
However, although the internal disputes between sub-basin committees represent a real challenge for the modern regulation of water in the PSRB, the persistency of environmental degradation seems to suggest some more fundamental inadequacies in the new regulatory framework. During our research, it was not difficult to realise that, in the last decade, most of the catchment plans and CEIVAP activities have evolved around a single issue: the implementation of bulk water charges (i.e. water pricing). The priority given to the internal details of the new charging scheme was so dominant and time consuming that virtually shifted the focus of the committee away from environmental and social questions. However, the real reason was rather more mundane: the industry preferred to take a proactive action in order to secure reduced fees and avoid close regulatory scrutiny. Instead of a democratic mechanism of decision-making, water policies were being manipulated by the stronger politico-economic players with only marginal contribution from the other stakeholders involved in the committee. The controversy about charges has, in effect, prevented the committee from considering in detail the environmental problems and social issues related to water in the river basin. For instance, during these negotiations, the position of the industrial sector was curiously supported by the environmental NGOs, which declined to impose higher charges alleging that that it was better to settle the matter at once. The contrast between the institutionalisation of public participation channels and the capture of the decision-making process by the stronger groups ('elite capture', according to Ribot, 2002) has significantly undermined the legitimacy of the new regulatory approaches, without producing the results that were expected, as we see next.
The narrow results of charging bulk water in the PSRB
Charging bulk water has been the central policy instrument of the new water regulation in the PSRB and constitutes the most evident expression of the IWRM-based regulation in the river basin. On paper, it was claimed that the new charging scheme (an economic instrument of environmental policy based on the polluter-pays principle) would allow for the mitigation of the environmental passive, induce rational use of water and reallocate water according to economic efficiency (Garrido, 2004) . In practice, however, despite all the controversy surrounding its adoption, income has remained low and has been spent on administration costs or on isolated projects. Despite of the tiny environmental contribution of the new charging scheme, something that is accepted even by mainstream economists that helped to introduce the new regulation (e.g. Azevedo and Baltar, 2005) , its implementation remains a very divisive matter. The difficulty to translate charges into environmental restoration in the Paraíba do Sul was early identified by academics that investigated the local circumstances (cf. Santos, 2002b) , but a few years down the line it is still rare to find an independent assessment of the concrete results of the new policy instrument. On the contrary, most publications tend replicate the discourse of official agencies and multilateral organisations (for instance, Braga et al., 2008) . In order to present a more objective evaluation of bulk water charges in the PSRB, we will follow here the five criteria for the success of economic instruments applied to environmental management proposed by the OECD (1991), namely, environmental effectiveness, equity, acceptability, administrative feasibility and cost, and economic efficiency.
In terms of its effectiveness, the introduction of bulk water charges has offered a very limited contribution to restoring the environmental condition of the PSRB. Acselrad et al. Regarding the second OECD criterion -equity -there are two main problems associated with the current charging scheme mechanism. First, at the moment there is no provision to compensate for the environmental degradation caused in the past by sectors like agriculture, mining and industry. In the case of the PSRB, some companies have been using and degrading the river for decades, while other users arrived in more recent times; even so, both groups bear the same charges. It means an unequal allocation of responsibilities, considering the cumulative (historical) contribution to the environmental degradation. That can be described as a perverse cross-subsidy between past and present, given that current water users subsidise, in the form of bulk water charges, those that benefited from the river in the past. Second, when commercial firms and water companies are charged, they can easily transfer the financial levy to their customers. It means that the additional environmental costs are passed on to prices, what reduces the chance for a 'just' distribution of responsibilities and only increases the position of the privileged groups (as observed by Enzensberger, 1996) .
Moving to the third criterion -acceptability -the level of suspicion and misinformation about the new water charging mechanism in the river basin remains very high. Among those supposed to pay for water use in 2004, more than haft of water users refused or delayed their payment, which to a large extent can be related to a perceived lack of legitimacy of the new regulatory regime (Soares, 2005) . In addition, as can be seen in Figure   2 , the income remains fairly constant since 2003, which suggests that acceptability is not improving. Among all sectors, the industrial stakeholders have taken the most opportunistic approach to the bulk water charges: despite the fact that their political representation in the river basin committee, via the federation of the states of São Paulo (FIESP), Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN) and Minas Gerais (FIEMG), agreed with the charges (as mentioned above), a significant proportion of the industrialists still maintain their dissatisfaction and refuse to make payments for their use of water (Féres et al., 2005) . It should be added, that among those that agreed to pay, many industrialists have done so mainly to improve the public image of their companies (a manoeuvre that is normally termed 'corporate green-wash'), as pointed out in several of our interviews. only water use from the main river is the object of a full charging mechanism, but the three states are beginning the implementation of their own schemes).
Probably the main failure of the PSRB charging mechanism is related to the fifth criterion: economic efficiency. In neoclassical economic terms, high level of efficiency means optimal allocation of resources according to maximum marginal utility and low-cost regulation compliance. However, thus far the new water charges have neither influenced the reallocation of water in the catchment, nor curbed the expansion of water use. On the contrary, the fundamental objective of the charging scheme has simply been the generation of income rather than incentives to stimulate efficiency and sustainable water use (cf. FormigaJohnsson et al. 2007 ). For instance, in a survey with 488 industrial facilities in the catchment, Féres et al. (2008) found that, at least during the initial implementation period, water charges
were not an effective mechanism to reduce effluent discharge. The same issue was highlighted in one of our interviews: For all the above reasons, it seems that the opportunity to improve water management has been largely wasted in the river basin under strong pressures for the adoption of water pricing exerted by the federal government. It confirms the observation by Brannstrom (2004: 217) that "[a]lthough goals of decentralisation may include better environmental management and more responsive government, the ultimate objective of reforms [in Brazil] is to implement water tariff schemes to fund water-related investments at the watershed scale". As long pointed out by Kapp (1970) , the underlying problem behind the adoption of market-based instruments of environmental management, such as bulk water charges, is that a monetary value (i.e. charge) is conferred to a non-mercantile resource (i.e. water); it therefore subverts the value relation between market and non-market attributes and dislocate environmental conservation. The treatment of water stakeholders according to their payment capacity has further eroded the differences between groups and, consequently, hidden the different responsibilities for the past and the present degradation of the PSRB. In other words, bulk water charges have provided a political excuse for not questioning the location, scale and operation of high impact activities. Finally, although the income generated has contributed little to restore the environmental condition of the river system, the controversy on the charges has virtually hijacked the discussion about water management in the river basin. Instead of creating synergisms between state and society, the persistent focus on charges has widened the communication gap between stakeholder groups.
The hierarchy of water stakeholders
The fact that, since its inception, most of the activities of the river committee have focused on the organisation and implementation of a charging scheme indicates the hegemony of a particular rationale of water management (i.e. the IWRM principles). The formalist objectives and the controversial nature of the charging scheme have operated as a barrier for the involvement of social movements and more grassroots organisations in the river basin committee. Despite the rhetoric of public participation and decentralisation, the activities of the river committee remain alien and unaccountable to the majority of water stakeholders. On the contrary, the reform of the institutions of water management has evolved towards discrimination and fragmentation, which was recurrent opinion expressed by some critical stakeholders at our interviews: The disputes between the federal administration and influential economic players have dominated the existence of the new committee and, crucially, shaped the interpretation of water management problems and the formulation of responses. Due to the limited space available for other stakeholders in the committee, there was a gradual departure from the social and natural problems to a concentration of efforts on trying to maintain existing sectoral advantages. Schematically, it is possible to separate the committee members into three hierarchical levels (see Table 2 Similarly, the academic community has its own hidden agenda in relation to the internal activities of the committee. It is no secret that during the first decade of CEIVAP the same group of academics from Rio de Janeiro universities was hired to produce plans, reports and computer models (sometimes with the veiled collaboration of civil servants that are themselves responsible for supervising the work of the consultants). Such distortions seem widespread in the activities of the local river basin committee and can be related to the observation of the Transparency International (2008) The same processes that damaged the river system in the past continue to compromise the ecological stability and the quality of life of local communities in the present (e.g. untreated effluent discharges, unmitigated river engineering, soil erosion, etc). The fundamental distortion is related to the priority given to the introduction of bulk water charges in the PSRB, which is always a highly divisive instrument of environmental management in any part of the world where it is adopted. The controversy about the charges has indeed poisoned the tenuous public mobilisation that started in the river basin in the 1990s, without raising sufficient funds to restore environmental quality and without inducing a more responsible use of water resources.
In the same way, the new regulatory framework has largely underestimated the social complexity and the political struggles that unfold in the river basin. In particular, our research identified a persistent reluctance to address the political dimension of water management among the members of the river basin committee. As a result, there is little recognition of the fact that the regulatory reforms have been systematically manipulated by the central government, via its water agency (ANA), and by the stronger economic groups, industry in particular. Evidently, the local residents and small water users are not passive about the condition of their river basin and try to occupy, as much as possible, the political space available to them in the new regulatory structure. Nonetheless, it is difficult to expect a sustained progress towards environmental sustainability without a more democratised basis of water management and the removal of political inequalities historically established in the PSRB. As pointed out by Middleton and O'Keefe (2001:16) , "unless analyses of development begin not with the symptoms, environmental or economic instability, but with the cause, social injustice, then no development can be sustainable". This observation seems to be immensely relevant to understand the hitherto contradictory results of water use and conservation in the Paraíba do Sul and, certainly, in other Brazilian river basins.
3 It is still possible to visit many of the lavish manor houses of the then affluent rural aristocracy, which included 32 noble titles among barons, viscounts and two earls (listed in Siqueira, in Müller, 1969) . 4 It is beyond the objectives of this paper to describe the full range of environmental problems in the Paraíba do Sul, but detailed assessment and analysis are available in Coppetec (2002 and . 5 Water management problems extend beyond the catchment boundaries via a complicated interconnection between the Paraíba do Sul and the Guandu Rivers. It has the capacity to transfer around 160 m3/s, which represents two thirds of the Paraíba do Sul water flow at the point of abstraction. From the Guandu River, water is further diverted to serve 80% of the population of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area (i.e. more than 12 million people depend on the Paraíba do Sul for their water supply). Because of the interbasin transfer, the Paraíba do Sul is significantly depleted of water in its medium section, aggravating an already precarious environmental condition. 6 Membership in the CEIVAP is distributed between water users (24 seats), representatives of the federal, state and municipal governments (21 seats) and civil society organisations (15 seats). It should be mentioned that civil society representation has been systematically abused by the appointment of members of business federations, professional councils and consortiums of municipalities instead of genuine civil society representatives (Projeto Marca d'Água, 2003) . 7 According to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, water has dual ownership: 1) federal, for those rivers that cross more than one state or are shared with other countries; and 2) state responsibility, for those confined to one state territory. 8 Sub-basin committees have a legal mandate similar to the river basin committee, while municipal consortia have more targeted objectives, such as waste and sanitation. 9 Because of the importance given to this issue, our research strategy was revised in the second month of the fieldwork and passed to consider the controversy around water user charges as the main indicator of the effectiveness of the institutional reforms in the PSRB. 10 The implementation of charges started in 2003, after an initial registration of 4,500 water users in the river basin (Braga et al., 2008) . All water uses above a certain threshold (i.e. consumptive use above 1 litre/second and hydropower bigger than 1 MW) must pay a monthly charge, calculated taking into account the extraction rate, the percentage of use and the quality of the effluent. There is a standard charge (R$ 0.02/m 3 ) for industries, water supply and mining, and significant discounts for agriculture and aquaculture.
